At the time of our prior article on Georgia’s Equitable Caregiver Act (the “ECA”), little if any caselaw had yet addressed its provisions. The ensuing two years, however, have seen several appellate decisions interpret the ECA. It consequently seems appropriate to revisit that statute and discuss how its terms have come to be enforced in our courts.

As previously discussed, the ECA allows adults who have helped raise children and who have bonded closely with them petition a court for adjudication as an equitable caregiver, a ruling which enables those adults to obtain parental rights over the child.(1) Petitioning adults first must demonstrate their standing to be recognized as equitable caregivers, by showing clear and convincing evidence that they have fulfilled five designated statutory requirements, all of which have now been applied in published appellate decisions as follows.

The petitioner must have fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life.

The Georgia Court of Appeals found this standard satisfied by a female petitioner who had been romantically involved with the mother of two minor children and lived with them for a number of years. The petitioner had served as a parental figure for both children since the time one child was adopted and the other was born. Evidence at trial showed that the petitioner and the children’s mother sent Christmas cards to friends and family featuring pictures of both women and the children, that she attended the children’s extracurricular events, and that she was listed on the children's school and medical forms until the parties separated, when the children were approximately eight and nine years old. Additionally, the parties had agreed to use the petitioner’s surname as the children’s middle names to recognize her role in their lives. Finally, the petitioner provided financial support to the mother to help with costs associated with the children and the household both while they were together and after they separated.(2)

The petitioner must have engaged in consistent caretaking of the child.

The Georgia Court of Appeals found this standard satisfied by a petitioner who assisted in feeding, bathing, changing, and generally caring for the children, who drove the children to some of their extracurricular events, and who met the children’s teachers.(3)

The petitioner must have established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child; the relationship must have been fostered or supported by a parent of the child, and the petitioner and the parent must have understood, acknowledged, or accepted or behaved as though the petitioner is a parent of the child.

The Georgia Court of Appeals found this standard satisfied by a petitioner who had strongly bonded with two children and made many sacrifices on their behalf. Evidence showed that both children referred to the female petitioner as “Momma,” and testimony from the children’s guardian ad litem stated that petitioner had a bond with the children that was repairable even though it had been fractured. Moreover, the petitioner’s surname was used as the children’s middle names in light of her role in their lives, and the petitioner was included in both the document submitted to potential birth mothers to assist in the parties’ efforts to adopt and in family holiday cards. Additionally, the mother testified at trial that “I don't think there was ever a question about whether or not [the petitioner] and I launched into the endeavor of pursuing children together.”(4)

The Court of Appeals has made clear that a bonded relationship without the accompanying support and acceptance of the child’s parent will preclude a finding that petitioner has satisfied this statutory factor.(5) The Court held, for instance, that two petitioners failed to establish this factor of the ECA where, although the petitioners presented evidence of their bonded and dependent relationship with the child, they failed to establish that they and the child’s mother had understood, acknowledged, or accepted that, or behaved as though, the petitioners were the parents of the child. A consent agreement which had given the petitioners custody of the child referred to the mother and father as the parents and to the petitioners as “petitioners” throughout and set forth conditions for the return of custody to the parents. And while the agreement allowed for custody to remain with the petitioners until the child reached the age of 18, it was clearly an agreement for temporary custody. The mother testified that she understood the agreement to be a temporary arrangement so that the children could be returned to her. Additionally, one of the petitioners acknowledged in testimony that the child knew petitioners were not his parents. That petitioner also acknowledged the mother’s anger at the fact that petitioners and not mother herself had given the child the news that his father had died.(6)

Although the ECA requires a petitioner to show the parent’s support and acceptance of the petitioner’s relationship with a child, that support and acceptance can be implied from the circumstances. For instance, the Court of Appeals found petitioners’ relationship with a child to have been fostered or supported by the mother, because she had been aware that the child was in their custody for almost the entirety of his life and she acknowledged through her actions in allowing the child to remain in their custody that she was aware they were taking a parental role in the child’s upbringing.(7)

The petitioner must have accepted full and permanent responsibilities as a parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation.

The Georgia Court of Appeals found this standard satisfied by a petitioner who attended the children’s extracurricular events and was listed on the children's school and medical forms until the parties separated, who provided financial support to the mother to help with costs associated with the children and the household both while the parties were together and after they separated, who assisted in feeding, bathing, changing, and generally caring for the children, who drove the children to some of their extracurricular events, and who met the children’s teachers.(8)

The petitioner must demonstrate that the child will suffer physical harm or long-term emotional harm if the petitioner is not granted equitable caregiver status and that continuing the relationship between such individual and the child is in the best interest of the child.

The ECA specifies four factors a court must consider in determining whether a child will suffer harm without the petitioning caregiver in the child’s life: who are the past and present caretakers of the child; with whom has the child formed psychological bonds and the strength of those bonds; whether competing parties evidenced an interest in, and contact with, the child over time; and whether the child has unique medical or psychological needs that one party is better able to meet.(9)

The Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s finding of harm, after considering the factors listed in the statute for determining harm, where evidence showed that the petitioner acted in the caretaker role for both children from the time of their adoption and birth until her time with them was restricted. Additionally, testimony at trial confirmed that the petitioner formed a bond with the children, and that both children saw her as their parent and referred to her as “Momma.” Moreover, the petitioner demonstrated a desire to maintain contact with the children as she continued to visit with them, assisted in taking them to extracurricular activities and school, and took them on trips even after the parties separated. Finally, although there was some evidence presented regarding one child’s diagnoses of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and anxiety, testimony at trial did not establish that the children had conditions that one party would be better equipped to address.(10)

Although the ECA requires a trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that a petitioning adult has satisfied each of the foregoing statutory factors, appellate caselaw has clarified that the statute imposes no duty on a judge to issue specific findings of fact in support of those rulings.(11)


(1) O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1(b), (g), and (h). (2) Skinner v. Miles, 361 Ga.App. 764, 768(1), 863 S.E.2d 578 (2021). (3) Skinner, supra, 361 Ga.App. at 769(1). (4) Id. (5) See In re K. L., 362 Ga.App. 590, 595-596(1), 869 S.E.2d 543 (2022). (6) K.L., supra, 362 Ga.App. at 595(1). (7) Hackett v. Stapleton, No. A22A0773, *9 (Ga. Ct. App., August 26, 2022). (8) Skinner, supra, 361 Ga.App. at 768-769(1). (9) O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1(e). (10) Skinner, supra, 361 Ga.App. at 769-770(1). (11) Teasley v. Clark, 361 Ga.App. 721, 723-724(4), 865 S.E.2d 556 (2021).

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